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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from final agency action in the form of an
order entered by the Industrial Commission* of Utah on May 23,
1988.

This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah

Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-14 (1987).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission complied with Price

River Coal Company v. Industrial Commission 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah
1986) when it once again awarded benefits to the respondent,
Marie T. Mabbutt.
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission committed reversible

error in its decision.
3.

Whether

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

demonstrated

extreme bias during the hearing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 13, 1982, Marie T. Mabbutt, hereinafter referred
to as "respondent," filed a claim for dependent's benefits and/or
burial
hearing

benefits with
was

held

on

the Industrial
May

8,

Commission of Utah.

1984, before

Keith

E.

Administrative Law Judge, Industrial Commission of Utah.

A

Sohm,
The

matter was then referred to a medical panel on May 23, 1984, by
Judge Sohm.
Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge awarded benefits to
the respondent.

But on December 31, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court

remanded this matter to the Industrial Commission for additional
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findings of fact. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission,
731 P. 2d 1079

(Utah 1986).

The Supreme Court found that the

Commission had to determine the nature of Fred C. Mabbutt's
activities

in

the

mine

on

the

day

of

his

death.

The

Administrative Law Judge made his tentative findings on July 8,
1987, and again referred the matter to the same to the medical
panel

for

further

evaluation.

The medical

supplemental report on September 1, 1987.

panel

filed its

On February 24, 1988,

the Administrative Law Judge filed his final Order Upon Remand
again awarding benefits to the respondent.
On March 7, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Review
objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that both
legal and medical causation had been established, as required by
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
March

10, 1988, respondent

filed

a

Cross-Motion

On

for Review

arguing that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded
attorneys' fees in addition to benefits awarded as opposed to
making them part of respondent's award and that the fee should
have been calculated based on a percentage of more than just the
first six years of benefits plus any interest awarded.

On May

23, 1988, the Industrial Commission denied petitioners' Motion
for Review.

With respect to respondent's Motion for Cross-

Review, the Commission found that the Administrative Law Judge
correctly calculated the attorneys fee.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The deceased, Fred C. Mabbutt, was born on November 26,
1919, and was one month short of his 62nd birthday when, on
October 23, 1981, he was found dead in the #3 mine of Price River
Coal Company located in Helper, Utah at the end of an eight-hour
shift as an underground coal mine beltman.

At the time of his

death, he was married to Marie T. Mabbutt, the respondent.

Mr.

and Mrs. Mabbutt were married on December 9, 1940.
Mr. Mabbutt weighed over 200 pounds and was approximately
six feet tall.

He had been treated for diabetes which was

diagnosed in 1975, and for high blood pressure which leveled off
when he began taking insulin.
took medication.

Mr. Mabbutt had gout for which he

He took Turns and aspirin to work in his lunch

bucket for his heartburn.

He had surgery for kidney stones, skin

cancer near his eye and he had a long history of hypertension.
He was neither a smoker nor a coffee drinker. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 3234, 39]
Mr. Mabbutt had been employed by Price River Coal Company
for approximately 6 years as a beltman which required him to keep
certain pumps and belts functioning as well as keeping the belts
and the areas around them clear of coal dust and other materials
that accumulated.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 26].

He worked in an area

located near two mine shafts which intersected at right angles
where a high conveyor belt, the top being about ten feet high,
carried coal and other materials to a point where it intersected
a lower conveyor belt which was less than waist high. [R. Vol. 2
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pg. 63, 92]

About 70 feet along the higher belt line was a

reservoir where coal dust slurry accumulated which was pumped
onto the higher beltline. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 46-92]
Mabbutt had to clear the pump.

At times Mr.

A slop-over of slurry consisting

of a thick black liquid had to either be shoveled with a squarenosed shovel up onto the high belt, or scooped into five gallon
buckets which then had to be carried and dumped onto the other
conveyor belt.

The bucket filled with slurry weighed about 60-70

pounds when full and Mr. Mabbutt carried a bucket in each hand.
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 46,47,92-96, 149]
Mr. Mabbutt was also required to scrape materials out from
under the beltline with a long-handled shovel, do "muck" and
cleanup work, spray the area with a hose, and "rock-dust" the
area.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 92-97]

The water hose was used to settle

the coal dust as a precautionary measure to avoid explosions as
was the rock dusting.

In addition, the area where Mr. Mabbutt

worked was a secondary emergency exit for underground workers in
the event of a disaster in the mine, such as an explosion or a
fire.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 68-69]

Hence, for safety reasons, Mr.

Mabbutt's job required him to keep the area clear of debris and
maintain it in good condition for escaping miners in the event of
an emergency.

He also had to keep his work area clear to avoid

being cited by the MSHA.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 46,58,68-69]

Mrs. Mabbutt testified that her husband

"... was always

disgusted because whoever worked the shift before him would not
clean up the beltline or do his job properly, and every time Fred
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went to work he would have to clean up after the other shift
besides his own."

[R. Vol. pg 27]

Mr. Mabbutt essentially

worked his shift alone without supervision and, in fact, it was
not unusual for him to work an entire 8-hour shift without seeing
a fellow worker.
On Friday October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt left his home at
6:00 o'clock in the morning to pick up Richard K. Westbrook, a
fellow coal miner on his way to work that day.
29,55]

[R. Vol. 2 pg

Mrs. Mabbutt testified that she did not notice anything

unusual about her husband when he left for work that morning.
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 29]
appeared normal.

Mr. Westbrook indicated that Mr. Mabbutt

In fact, Mr. Mabbutt talked about going hunting

with his children.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 54-55]

During his last work day, Mr. Mabbutt commenced work and had
been at his station for approximately three hours when Gene M.
Miller, a belt inspector, visited his area at approximately 11:15
in the morning.

[R. Vol. 2. pg 62, Vol. 1 pg. 134]

When Mr.

Miller arrived at Mr. Mabbutt's work area, he noticed a build-up
of muck. [R. Vol 1 pg. 125-126]

Mr. Miller also observed Mr.

Mabbutt as he attempted to stuff a one-inch water hose down into
a larger hose which was attached to the sump-pump in an effort to
unplug the pump.
Mabbutt.

In doing this, water was squirting all over Mr.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 64, Vol. 1 pg. 132]

When asked what he

was doing, Mr. Mabbutt swore violently and complained about the
plugged-up pump.

Mr. Miller perceived Mr. Mabbuttfs swearing as

very unusual since he had never heard him swear before. [R. Vol.
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2 pg. 64-65]

Mr. Miller noted that the method being used to

unplug the pump was one that he had never observed before.
Vol 2 pg. 68]

[R.

Mr. Miller noticed that Mr. Mabbutt1s clothes were

extremely wet. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 64,65,70-72,76-77,79]

Mr. Miller

also testified that he could not hear the pump working at that
time, which meant that the area was getting more plugged up as
time went on. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 67]
The area of the build-up was approximately ten by twenty
feet. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 125,127,130]

That area was on a slope, the

deepest end being two feet. [R. Vol 1 pg. 125, 129]

[2nd Tr. 32,

36]

[R. Vol 1 p

This area was referred to as a "sump area."

129-130]

The pump which was normally used to pump the muck from

this area was plugged at the time when Mr. Miller arrived in the
area on October 23, 1981. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 130,132]

Mr. Miller

also observed slurry going over the dam. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 67]
Tr. 48]

[1st

Mr. Miller further observed Mr. Mcibbutt attempting to

move the 110 pound pump out of the muck.

Mr. Mabbutt was

straining to pull on the hose attached to the pump and appeared
extremely agitated and angry to Mr. Miller.

[R. Vol. 2 pg.

65,70-72,78]
With the pump plugged, the only way to clear the sump area
was to fill five gallon buckets and carry the muck out of the
sump area. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 130]

Mr. Miller testified that he

observed Mr. Mabbutt fill a "couple buckets" and carry the filled
buckets out of the area. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126]

Mr. Miller stated

that while he was at lunch he saw Mr. Mabbutt make "several
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trips" carrying two buckets at a time. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126]
filled buckets weighed about 50 to 60 pounds each.

These

Mr. Mabbutt

had to walk sixty to seventy feet up a six to eight percent
incline to the second belt to empty the buckets.
100-101] [2nd Tr. 7-8]

[R. Vol. 1 pg.

The ground was not flat or level.

Mabbutt had to walk where the coal had "been mined out."
1 pg. 101]

Mr.

[R. Vol

Mr. Miller testified that it required the filling and

carrying of at least one hundred buckets to clear the area where
Mr. Mabbutt was working of all the muck.

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 134]

Although Mr. Miller asked Mr. Mabbutt to eat lunch with him
at that time, Mr. Mabbutt replied that he had to get the pump
unclogged, and declined.

[R. Vol 2 pg. 69-70]

In fact, Mr.

Miller testified that he asked Mr. Mabbutt three times to sit
down and eat his lunch, but Mr. Mabbutt refused to do so and
continued trying to unplug the clogged sump pump. [R. vol 2 pg.
72]

Mr. Miller stated that at one point Mr. Mabbutt became so

upset that he threw his gloves on the ground.
70,73]

[R. Vol. 2 pg.

Mr. Miller also testified that Mr. Mabbutt's hands and

face appeared a bit pale at that time [R. Vol. 2 pg. 73], and
that it could not have been due to rock dusting, since it was too
early in the shift for Mr. Mabbutt to be utilizing the rock
duster. [R. Vol 2 pg. 82]
At the conclusion of Mr. Mabbutt's shift, and at the request
of Mr. Westbrook who was supposed to ride home from work with Mr.
Mabbutt on that day, a search was made for Mr. Mabbutt who had
not come out of the mine on time. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 76]
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His

replacement on the following shift, Evelyn L« Hicks, reached the
area at approximately 4:20 p.m. and noticed that the area had not
been rock-dusted.

She heard the pump operating and water running

onto the higher belt

[R. Vol. 2. pg. 97] [1st Tr. 78]. When she

saw Mr. Mabbutt's coat and lunch bucket, she began looking for
him.

Ms. Hicks found Mr. Mabbutt laying flat on his back with

his head near the sidewall of the shaft.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 98-99]

One of Mr. Mabbut's eyes was open and the other was closed.
Mabbutt

was

holding

the

small

water

hose, which was

Mr.
still

running, in his left hand and water was spurting across Mr.
Mabbutt's body.
No. 2 shovel.

Nearby was one empty, but wet, muck bucket and a
The area around the sump pump was clear and no

build-up of muck was evident. [R. Vol 2 pg. 100-101]
At the July 7, 1987 hearing, Mr. Miller testified that the
water and coal fines had built up and were spilling over the dam
when he came over the overcast. [R. Vol. 1 pg» 124-125]
Mr. Miller further testified that the area in which there
was a build up of material was approximately ten by twenty
feet.

The build up of material was approximately two inches to

two feet deep. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 125]
Mr. Miller

also testified

that he observed Mr. Mabbutt

making "several trips11 carrying two buckets weighing sixty to
seventy pounds each.

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 126].

Finally, Mr. Miller

testified that it would require at least one hundred buckets to
clear the size of spill he observed. [R. Vol 1 pg. 134].
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Mabbutt died of a heart attack he suffered while working
as a beltman in the appellant's mine.

As a beltman, his duties

required him to keep his work area clean and to make sure that
the conveyor belts were functioning.
But, on October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt was confronted with
more.

On that day, the pump which is utilized to keep the work

area clean was not working.

As a result, the "slurry" and "muck"

material was rapidly accumulating in Mr. Mabbutt's work area.
There was a spill of this material which covered a ten by twenty
foot area and was two inches to two feet deep.

Mr. Mabbutt

attempted to unplug the pump by stuffing a smaller water hose
into the pump line.
the "muck."

He also attempted to pull the pump out of

Mr. Mabbutt was seen making several trips carrying

two buckets filled with "muck" and which weighed 60 to 70 pounds,
up a 7% incline to dump the "muck", which was accumulating in his
work area and which was spilling over a dam, onto a second
belt.

Given the size of the "muck" spill, the uncontradicted

testimony was that it would require at least 100 buckets to clean
the spill.

This meant that Mr. Mabbutt would be required to make

fifty trips of approximately sixty to seventy feet while carrying
two heavy buckets.
Mr. Mabbutt was very frustrated over the accumulation
over the plugged pump.
clean his work area.

and

Mr. Mabbutt was also under pressure to
Not only because it was his job, but

because this area also served as a secondary escape way for the
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miners in the event an emergency occurred in the mine.

And, a

build up of this material could result in citations from MSHA.
All

of

the

facts

support

the

Industrial

Commission's

conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt's employment activity on October 23,
1981 involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over his
non-employment life.
The sum and substance of the medical testimony presented to
the Industrial Commission was that the unusual and extraordinary
exertion which Mr. Mabbutt experienced
substantially

contributed

to

and was

on October

23, 1981,

a precipitating

factor

resulting in Mr. Mabbutt's fatal heart attack.
Appellants

have

failed

to

present

any

evidence

which

contradicts the evidence presented by respondent with respect to
the work activities performed by Mr. Mabbutt on October 23,
1981.

Appellants

have

also

failed

to present

any medical

evidence to contradict the findings of the medical panel or
respondent's medical expert.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

remanded

this

Industrial Commission for a specific purpose.

matter

to

the

The Industrial

Commission has now satisfied the requirements of the Utah Supreme
Court and has again awarded respondent the bemefits to which she
is entitled.

This Court has no choice but to affirm the final

administrative decision of the Industrial Commission.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PROPERLY FOLLOWED THE MANDATE OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
1.

Legal Cause.
The

Industrial

Commission

properly

followed

the

direction given by the Utah Supreme Court in Price River Coal
Company v. Industrial Commission/

731 P.2d

1079

(Utah 1986),

after applying the Allen v. Industrial Commission/ 729 P.2d. 15
(1986) analysis to the initial findings and conclusions entered
by the Industrial Commission in this matter.

The Utah Supreme

Court remanded this case to the Industrial Commission "so that
proper findings of fact [could] be entered and the Allen standard
[could] be applied to them to determine legal cause11

Allen v.

Industrial Commission/ at 1083. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 59-62]
Since
condition/
"employment

the

Mr.

Mabbutt

Industrial

activity

suffered

from

a

Commission

must

find

involved

some

unusual

or

pre-existing
that

his

extraordinary

exertion over and above the usual wear and tear and exertion on
non-employment life."
Commission at 1082.

Price River Coal Company v. Industrial

[R. Vol. 1. pg. 61] If this finding is made,

then the "legal cause" requirement has been satisfied.

Id.

In his Order Upon Remand the Administrative Law Judge made
just such a finding.

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 372-379]

The Administrative

Law Judge concluded that Mr. Mabbutt was a coal miner who was
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confronted with a plugged sump pump. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 376]

As a

result of this, coal fines and muck spilled over a dam creating a
large puddle which was two inches to two feet deep and covered a
ten by twenty feet area.

[R. Vol 1 pg. 124-125, 376]

The

Administrative Law Judge heard testimony that Mr. Mabbutt was
pulling on the pump and that he was attempting to unplug the pump
by utilizing a water hose. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 132, Vol. 2 pg. 68]

In

addition, Mr. Mabbutt knew he was working in an area which, in
the event of an emergency, would be used by the miners as a
secondary escape way. [R. Vol 1. pg. 103].
The Administrative Law Judge heard further testimony that
Mr. Mabbutt filled five gallon buckets with "muck" and carried
two such buckets to the next belt.

Mr. Mabbutt had to carry the

buckets up a steep 7% slope for approximately seventy feet.

Each

bucket weighed approximately sixty-five pounds when filled with
muck. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 100-101]
The uncontracticted testimony was that it would have taken
at least one hundred buckets filled with muck to clean out the
area in which Mr. Mabbutt was working. [R. Vol. 1 p 134]
Based

upon

the

uncontradicted

facts,

the

Industrial

Commission concluded that Mr. Mabbutt's "employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in
everyday life because of his condition."
Commission, at 25.

Allen v. Industrial

[R. Vol 1. pg. 372-379]

Hence, the legal

cause requirement adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen has
clearly been satisfied by the respondent.
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2.

Medical Cause.
The Utah Supreme Court also required the respondent to

establish medical cause.
Under

the medical

Allen v. Industrial Commission at 27.

cause test, the respondent

"must show by

evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, or
exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting
injury or disability."

Id.

Applying this portion of the Allen requirements to this
case,

it

once

again

becomes

clear

requirement has also been satisfied.

that

the

medical

cause

Appellants' expert, Dr.

Fowles, agreed that Mr. Mabbutt's work activities, on the day of
his death, probably contributed substantially to increase Mr.
Mabbutt's risk of having a fatal heart attack.

[R. Vol. 1 pg.

320-322,365,367,368]
The

medical

panel

found

that

Mr.

activities on October 23, 1981, led to his death.
389-390]
Commission

Mabbutt's

work

[R. Vol. 3 pg.

All the medical evidence presented to the Industrial
supports

the

conclusion

that

Mr.

Mabbutt's

work

activities on October 23, 1981, were a sufficient precipitating
factor resulting in his death by heart attack. [R. Vol. 3 pg.
389-390, Vol. 1 pg. 300,305]
The medical; cause requirement adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court in Allen has also been clearly satisfied by the respondent.
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II
THIS COURT MUST UPHOLD THE
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNLESS THEY
ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
This Court recently reaffirmed that it "will not disturb the
findings and order of the Industrial Commission unless they are
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and capricious
when they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable
basis in the evidence."

American Roofing Company v. Industrial

Commission, 752 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah App. 1988) citing Rushton v.
Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986).
Respondent has set forth herein all facts which support the
Industrial Commission's findings and order.

Based thereon, this

Court must affirm the Industrial Commission's final Order.

The

mere fact that appellants are not satisfied with the findings and
order does not render them arbitrary and capricious.
Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION
IS NOT BASED UPON IMPROPER FINDINGS OF FACT
In their brief appellants cry foul because the Industrial
Commission allegedly made some findings which are not supported
by evidence.

Appellants cite the following findings in their

brief.
1.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt

tried to lift and pull the 110 pound pump out of the sump, "but
with no success." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 375]
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The only testimony on this finding was given by Mr.
Miller who stated that he was watching Mr. Mabbutt pull on the
pump but that he [Mr. Miller] could not actually see the pump.
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 71]
There is no evidence that the pump was ever pulled out
of the muck prior to the area being cleaned by Mr. Mabbutt.
2.

The Administrative

Law Judge

found that Mr. Miller

"observed that the coal fine and muck had spilled over the block
dam. . ." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 375]
Mr. Miller testified he observed "coal fines and water
and so forth" spill over the dam. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 124-125]
3.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt

made four trips from the sump area to the No. 4 belt. [R. Vol. 1
pg. 375]
Mr. Miller testified that he could not state exactly
how many trips Mr. Mabbutt made.

Mr. Miller did however state he

observed Mr. Mabbutt make "several trips two buckets each time,
say he made four trips." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126]
4.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was

not shoveling coal fine from beneath the rollers [R. Vol. 1 pg.
375]
There is no evidence that Mr. Mabbutt was doing any
shoveling except to fill his fine buckets with muck.

Appellants'

citation to 0'Green's testimony [See Appellants' Brief pg. 10] is
an

unconscionable

attempt

to

distort

the

truth.

0'Green's

testimony was based upon observations he made after Mr. Mabbutt's
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body had been found, at which time the pump was working and after
Mr. Mabbutt had cleared the "muck spill" by using his back, his
legs, his arms, his shovel and his buckets.
5.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was

shoveling and carrying buckets until his death. [R. Vol. 1 pg
375]
When Mr. Mabbutt1 s body was found, he was holding a
water hose, which was still running, and a shovel and wet muck
bucket were found close by.

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 100-101]

This type

of physical evidence lends itself to the logical and reasonable
conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt was indeed using the muck bucket and
shovel until his demise.

The fact that the area had not been

"rock dusted" [R. Vol. 2 pg. 97] could lead a person to the
reasonable conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt was still carrying the
heavy buckets and was also attempting to unplug the pump, which
was what he had been doing when Mr. Miller observed him during
the lunch hour.
6.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was

under pressure to keep the area clean.

[R. Vol. 1 pg 376]

Mr. Mabbutt was under extreme pressure.
as a beltman to keep the area clean.

It was his job

The area was a secondary

escape way, and if the area was not kept clean, there was a
potential MSHA violation.
In view of this and the fact that the pump was not working
and that the water and coal fines were spilling over the dam, it
is hard to accept appellants' argument that Mr. Mabbutt felt no
pressure.
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7.
"work

The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbott's
activities

exertion]"

and

on

that

October
these

23,

1981,

activities

involved

[unusual

"contributed

something

substantial to increase the risk which he already faced in every
day life because of his condition."
The

record

is

littered

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 376

with

facts

Administrative Law Judge's conclusion.

that

support

the

Mr. Mabbutt was agitated

[R. Vol. 2 pg. 65] the pump was not working [R. Vol. 2 pg. 68]
the water and coal fines were spilling over the dam [R. Vol. 1
pg. 124-125] he attempted to pull the pump out of the mud [R.
Vol. 2 pg. 71], he carried five gallon buckets filled with muck,
which weighed approximately 65 pounds, up a 7% incline for a
distance of 60-70 feet [R. Vol. 1 pg. 100-101,126] and he was
under the stress of attempting to keep his work area, which was
also a secondary escape way, clear [R. Vol. 1 pg. 103].
Appellants1

charge that findings of unusual exertion is
»

based

upon

speculation

Administrative

Law

and

Judge

[Appellants1 brief p 13-14]
rely

throughout

is

the

further

inferences

are

charge
not

that

the

reasonable.

The one witness upon who appellants

0'Green.

01Green's testimony

entirely upon speculation and assumption.

is

based

O1Green did not work

with, talk to or even see Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981.
0'Green did not inspect Mr. Mabbutt's work area until after Mr.
Mabbutt's body had been taken out of the mine. [R. Vol. 1 pg.
161]

0'Green's testimony is just not credible.

Mr. Miller

testified that the water and coal fine were spilling over the
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dam. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 124-125]
Mr.

Mabbutt,

Mabbutt.

and

he

Mr. Miller was there, he observed

observed

the

problems

confronting

Mr.

0'Green's testimony that the material in the area was

not nearly to a point of overflow [R. Vol. 3. pg 517] is not
credible

because

that

testimony

is

based

upon

0'Green's

observation after Mr. Mabbutt had already cleaned the area. [R.
Vol. 1 pg. 161]

By citing 0'Green's testimony to support the

argument that the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion is just
not reasonable, counsel for appellants is distorting the record
and is a blatant attempt to manufacture conflict where there is
none.
The appellants cannot cite any evidence to contradict
that Mr. Mabbutt did make several trips carrying heavy muck
buckets to clean his work area.

Appellants cannot cite any

evidence that Mr. Mabbutt actually managed to unplug the pump by
using the water hose.

It is counsel for the appellants who is

making unreasonable inference by building his case on the suspect
testimony 0'Green and Dr. Bloswick.
conclusions

reached

by

The assumptions made and

Dr. Bloswick were based, to a great

extent, on information he obtained from 0'Green and appellants'
counsel, not upon his review of the record. [R Vol. 1 pg. 202206]
The appellants

also suggest that the Administrative Law

Judge should have made certain findings. [Appellants' Brief pg
16-20]

There is no question that Mr. Mabbutt was suffering from

a pre-existing condition.

Price River Coal Company v. Industrial

Commission, at 1082.
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There

is

also

no

question

that

the

medical

evidence

presented by the three cardiologists supports the Administrative
Law Judge's finding of medical causation. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 377]
Dr. Perry concluded that "I still feel that the patient's work
activities were a material contributing factor to [Mr. Mabbutt's]
death from coronary artery disease."

[R. Vol 1 pg. 305]

Mr.

Mabbutt's work provided the impetus of exertion which contributed
to his sudden death on October 23, 1983."
Even

appellants'

expert

essentially

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 300]

agreed

with

the opinion

rendered by respondent's expert, Dr. Yanowitz. [R. Vol. 3 pg.
541]
IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT
DEMONSTRATE ANY BIAS DURING THE HEARING
The record does not support appellants' allegation that the
Administrative Law Judge demonstrated any bias.

Appellants cite

this court to a statement made by the Administrative Law Judge
during the hearing.

Appellants' charge that the Administrative

Law Judge "interrupted and in a lengthy and argumentative manner"
[Appellants' Brief pg 21] said "I find that hard to believe." [R.
Vol. 1 pg. 196]
A

review

of

the

discussion

preceeding

that

statement

indicates that the Administrative Law Judge did not interrupt.
The Administrative Law Judge was attempting to clarify which
exhibit

appellants'

counsel

was

referring

examination of the witness. [R. Vol 1 pg 194-196]
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to

during

his

It was following the Administrative Law Judge's summary of
his understanding of the witness1 testimony, and the witness
basically

agreed with that summary, that the now

statement was made. [R. Vol 1 pg. 102]
have alerted

questioned

This statement should

appellants' counsel that the Administrative Law

Judge was having some concern over the witness' testimony and
counsel should have clarified the testimony.

The Administrative

Law Judge was sending up a "red flag" which counsel obviously
ignored.
As set forth herein, 0'Green's testimony is not relevant to
the issues raised in this case.
Mabbutt on October 23, 1981.

0'Green had no contact with Mr.
0'Green did not ever inspect Mr.

Mabbutt's work area until after Mr. Mabbutt's body had been
removed from the mine.

0'Green, quit simply did not offer any

testimony which is useful in resolving the issues which the Utah
Supreme Court wanted resolved when it remanded this matter.
With

respect

to

Dr.

Bloswick's

testimony,

it has been

established that his assumption and conclusions were based, to a
great degree, upon information received from cippellants1 counsel,
0'Green and not from the record.

[R. Vol. 1 pg. 202-206]

V
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DID COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
SECTION 63-43B-10(l)(a)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-43b-10(1)(a)

(Supp. 1988)

requires the Administrative Law Judge to include in his order a
statement

of his

findings of
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fact based

exclusively

on the

evidence of record.

The findings made by the Administrative Law

Judge in this case are supported by the evidence.
drawn

in

counsel,

this

case,

are

all

although

not

reasonable

uncontradicted evidence.

and

acceptable
are

The inference
to appellants'

supported

by

the

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge

did comply with the mandate of Section 63-43b-10(l)(a).
CONCLUSION
This case involves a claim

for benefits under the Utah

Workers Compensation Act, a remedial act.

If there is any doubt,

it must be resolved in favor of the respondent.
Based upon the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Price
River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission and upon the testimony
and

evidence

presented

to

the

Industrial

Commission,

it is

respectfully requested this court affirm the May 23, 1988, order
of the Industrial Commission.

The respondent has satisfied all

of the requirements imposed upon her by statute and by the Utah
Supreme Court, and is therefore entitled to the benefits awarded
by the Industrial Commission.
\

DATED this 21st day of October,^aT988.
DAHNEY & DABNEY,\P.CJ
/

Mabbutt
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies, postage pre-paid, of the foregoing document on this the
28th day of October, 1988, to the following:
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Attorneys for Industrial Commission/
Second Injury Fund
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
James M. Elegante, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIME
185 South State Street,/Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah $4111-

Plaintiff

j
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ADDENDUM
Administrative Law Judge Order (December 20, 1988).
Utah Industrial Commission Order (January 25, 1985).
Supreme Court Decision (December 31, 1986).
Administrative Law Judge Order Upon Remand
1988) .

(February 24,

Utah Industrial Commission Order Denying Motion for Review
(May 23, 1988).
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Case No. 82001604

AgXE

T. HABBUTTt widow of,
fgD MABBUTT, deceasedt
Applicant*

*
*
*
*

a
a

FINDINGS OP PACT

*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAV

a
a
a
a

.RICE 1IVE1 COAL COMPANY
ind/or IMA,

AND ORDER

*

a
a

Defendants•
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 3349 Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 30, 1983
at 1:00 p.m. o'clock*
Said hearing was pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

HEARING ON
OBJECTIONS:

Hearing Room 3349 Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 24,
1984 at 8:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order
and Notice* of the Commission.

BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

Keith Sohm, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was present and represented by Tirginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
The
defendants
were
represented
by
Robert
J.
Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law, at the first hearing and
by James H. Elegante and Erie V. Boorman at the
Hearing on Objections.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The 61 year old Fred C. Habbutt was employed on the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00
p.m. shift in the underground mine of Price River Coal as a beltman which
required him to keep eertain pumps and belts functioning as well as keeping
tha area elear of coal, dust and other materials that may slop over or
accumulate la his area where two belt lines intersect at right angles. The
applicant was found dead October 23, 1981 at 4:20 p.m. at the job site with
the cause being identified as a coronary insufficiency from an arterial
sclerotic cardiovascular disease. In order to recover workmen*s compensation
benefits it must be shown that he died of an accident on the job. The term
accident has been expanded to include situations involving unusual exertion or
unusual stress.

MA1XE MABBUTX
FINDINGS OF FACT
PAC1 TWO

Prior to the Incident on Wednesday, October 21, 1981, the applicant
ate some tacos and spent a restless night was sick and vomited about 1:00
o'clock a.m. the next morning. Applicant*s wife urged him not go to work on
on Thursday which he did not do, but returned to work as usual looking quite
normal on Friday morning, October 23. The applicant usually carried Turns and
Aspirin In his lunch pail. He weighed over 200 pounds and was about six foot
tell. He had been treated for high blood pressure back in 1975, which leveled
off when he began taking medication for that purpose and for sugar diabetes
which also was discovered in 1975, for which he took one shot of insulin a day
and watched his diet. He also had gout for which he took medication. He had
two operations for kidney stones. He was not a smoker nor coffee drinker.
The applicant worked in an area where two mine shafts intersected at
right angles where a high conveyor belt, the top being about nine feet high,
carried products to a point where it intersected a lower conveyor belt which
was less than waist high. About 70 to 75 feet along the higher belt line was
a reservoir where coal dust slurry accumulated which was pumped into the
higher belt line. On occasions, the applicant had to clear the pump by
•ticking a one inch nozzle Into the hose connected to the pump to flush it
out. A slop over of slurry consisting of a thick black liquid had to be
•hoveled with a square-nosed shovel up to the high belt or scooped into a five
gallon bucket which was carried 70 to 75 feet down to the lower belt and
dumped Into that conveyor belt. The bucket filled with slurry weighed about
65 pounds and on occasions the applicant would carry a bucket in each hand.
At about 11:00 a.m. a fellow employee saw the applicant and noted he
was quite agitated because he was trying to stick the one inch hose of running
water into the larger hose of the pump and water was splattering getting him
wet from the spray. When asked how he was doing Mr. Mabbutt cussed quite
violently. The fellow employee indicated that he could not hear the pump
working at that time. He invited Mr. Mabbutt to sit down with him and have
lunch, but Mr. Mabbutt declined. He also observed Mr. Mabbutt pulling on a
hose to loosen the pump up out of the muck. In addition to shoveling coal
dust and muck and doing cleanup work, the applicant was also responsible to
•pray rock dust in the area at the end of the shift to settle the coal dust.
A lady beltman responsible to do the same work as Mr. Mabbutt came in
on her shift following Mabbutt's shift. She arrived at about 4:20 p.m.,
October 23, 1981 and noticed the area had not been rock dusted. She heard the
pump operating and water running into the higher belt. When she saw Mr.
Mabbutt9s coat and lunch bucket, she began looking for him and found him
laying flat on his back with his head near the sidewall of the shaft. One eye
was open and one eye was closed. He had the running hose in his left hand
which was still spurting across his body to the right toward the sump
reservoir. There was one empty bucket and a shovel nearby. The beltlady
Indicated that they work a total of 7 1/2 hours out of which 1/2 hour goes to
lunch and that the beltman spends about 5 hours shoveling and six hours on
other duties, which, of eourse, was not consistent.

JIIE HABBUTT
[NDXNCS OF FACT
ICE THREE

The ttedieai assets of the case were referred to a medical panel for
valuation. The medical panel returned its report a copy of which was
irculated to the parties. The defendants objected to the medical panel
eport.
A Hearing was held on the objections.
The medical witnesses
estlfying at the Hearing on Objections were Dr. Frank G. Tanowitx, a
:ardlologist who had previously testified on behalf of the applicant and Dr.
Joseph Perry* the sole member of the medical panel who was called in support
>f his medical panel report favoring the applicant. The defendants called Dr.
Robert E. Fowles a cardiologist in support of its position that the death of
dr. Habbutt was not industrially related. All three doctors agreed that Mr.
Habbutt was a high risk candidate for a sudden cardiac death or for a
continued myocardial infarction and that it could have happened at any time.
Some of the factors which caused him to be a high risk in addition to his
heart condition were his age, hypertension, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia and
gout.
The doctors agreed that a person with these problems may more
frequently experience a sudden death when involved in physical exertion or
possibly with emotional stress.
Dr. Tanowitx appeared at the first hearing and after hearing the
testimony concerning the type of work activities Hr. Habbutt was engaged in
acknowledged that the work would put a strain on the cardiovascular system.
The doctor further acknowledged that if Hr. Habbutt was in an agitated
emotional state, that could cause an even further hemodynamic demand on the
heart muscles. Emotional strain or pressure could aggravate and further
increase the myocardial oxygen demands. Dr. Tanowitx felt there was a causal
relationship between the activities that Hr. Habbutt performed and the
stresses that he was under on the date of his death and his eventual demise.
The doctor further indicated that after hearing final testimony on the last
day of hearing including the testimony of Dr. Fowles that it did not change
his opinion. Dr. Tanowitx9s opinion, of course, agreed with that of the
medical panel. Dr. Fowles disagreed only to the extent of saying that be did
mot have any evidence which would support, in his mind, that Hr. Habbutt
engaged in strenuous activities or was under a stress during the period
immediately before his demise. Dr. Tanowitx did not feel the four hour period
between the time he was last seen by his fellow worker and the time of his
demise was especially significant.
The findings of the medical panel were received in evidence and the
Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings of the medical panel as his own
which are as follows:
Vere the stresses at work or work activities performed by Hr.
Habbutt a material factor contributing to his death?
X feel the activities of the day of his death probably
contributed to his death.
I gather the day was unusually
stressful psychologically and was demanding physically. Hr.
Habbutt9s work seemed to involve a lot of exertion using his
upper body which usually, or more easily provokes myocardial
Ischemia. In addition he appears to have died shortly after a

til MABBUTT
IDINCS Or FACT
SB FOUE

meal. A meal combined with activity seems to worsen myocardial
ischemia. His emotional charged state probably contributed to
his death, howevert that may or may not have been attributable
to his employment.
Did the employment of Mr. Habbutt merely provide the occasion or
was it the cause of his death?
This is a very difficult question best answered by the word
yes. However, for the purpose of this opinion, I would have to
say it contributed to his death but was not the cause thereof
per •••
Would Mr. Habbutt have died of this condition regardless of the
work, or might the death have occurred at home or during any
other type of activity just as readily as it did at work?
My opinion is that his death might have occurred at any time at
home or any other place. However, his work provided enough in
terms of physical and emotional stress that yit
final event
occurred while employed. Mr. Mabbutt had coronary artery disease
which was probably without symptoms, a common problem among
diabetics. Whether his stomach distress the day before his
demise or his diaphoresis the day of his demise were symptoms
related to his coronary artery disease are purely conjectural at
this point.
Unfortunately the first symptom which Mr. Mabbutt experienced
was
sudden
death
which
is not
uncommon
occurring in
approximately 25% of individuals with coronary artery disease.
The stress of being behind, of needing to catch up, of eating a
meal, then or working physically vigorously would have been
stressful for a healthy man but far too severe a stress for a
man with advanced coronary artery disease. Thus, these factors
provided an excellent milieu for the appearance of his initial
symptom, death. Thus, I feel that his employment provided a
significant contribution to his death but was not the cause
thereof, per se.
Dr. Powles acknowledged that the medical panel9s opinion would be
considered in the medical community as a reasoned medical opinion. The
defendants in a 41 page very scholarly memorandum in opposition to grant of
award, emphasized that there is no evidence to show that the applicant was
engaged in unusual exertion or undergoing exceptional emotional stress
immediately before his death. Of course the body was found about 4:20. Dr.
Tanowitt was not concerned about that short few hours from the time the fellow
employee testified
concerning
the applicant's agitated and stressful
activities of attempting to unplug the pump earlier. Furthermore there is no
way of knowing exactly how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the applicant

HAK1& n A s w .

FINDINGS or FACT
FAGS FIVE

first felt the effects of that stress or at what time he actually died but It
could have been some hours before 4:20 p.m. Ve are not called upon to
•peculate as to those times or as to the excessive stress or exertion later in
the afternoon in view of the fact that two fine cardiologists have agreed that
the evidence is sufficient to convince them that the death was Industrially
related.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Habbutt died as the
result of an accident In the course of his employment on October 23, 1981
resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with his employment on
that fateful afternoon. The applicant Is entitled to the maximum benefits in
affect at the time of $218.00 per week for six years for a total of $68,016.00
with an additional $1,000.00 burial benefit. The applicant is entitled to
$35,752.00 in a lump sum to bring payments current with weekly benefits due
after December 21, 1984, at the rate of $218.00 per week until the balance is
paid in full.
Attorney's fees, based on the formula provided by the
Commission, would be $9,800.00. There were no dependent children of the
applicant and the deceased at the time of the death.

CONCLUSIONS OP LAV:
The defendants should pay the applicant the sums set forth above.

ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants pay the applicant the
current due amount of $35,752.00 in a lump sum and $218.00 per week beginning
December 21 and every week thereafter until the total of $68,016.00 has been
made less attorney's fees. The defendants shall pay the additional sum of
$1,000.00 for burial allowance.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay out of the award the sum of
$9,800.00 to applicant's attorney, Virginius Dabney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant report immediately to the
Industrial Commission and to the defendant any change of address or change of
marital status.
Shall

be

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof

HAKIB RASBUTT
FINDINGS Or PACT
PACE 1X1

specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

\U

Keith K. Soha
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah. this > ^ ^ i*,.Jt\
f<r*V
ATTEST:

/a/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary

X certify that on /iU^ce ~~J+*^
•?£
1984 % copy of the
attached ORDER was Ballad to the following parsons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Harle Habbutt
260 Vest 500 South
Price, Ut. 84501
Yirginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84111
IMA
P.O. Box 390
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84110
tobert J. Shaughnessy
Attorney at Law
S43 East S00 South #3
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84102
^James H. Elegante
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT

84147-0898

Price Biver Coal Company
Helper, UT 84526
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 82001604
*
*

MARIE T. MABBUTT, Widow of
FRED C. MABBUTT, Deceased,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

DENIAL OF

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

PRICE RIVER COAL COMPANY
and/or INA,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about December 20, 1984, an Order was entered by an
Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in
the above entitled case.
On or about January 7, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of December 20, 1984, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Lenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on January ^
« 1985, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:

Marie Mabbutt, 260 West 500 South, Price, UT 84501
^Tirginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, #412, SLC, UT 84101
INA, P. 0. Box 390, SLC, UT 84110
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 South, #3, SLC, UT
84102
James M. Elegante, Atty., & Erie V./ Boorman, Atty., P. 0. Box
11898, SLC, UT 84147-0898

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

by

Wilma

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Price River Coal Co. and
Insurance Co, of North
America, Employer-Carrier,
Plaintiffs,
v.
The Industrial Commission of
Utah and Marie T. Mabbutt,
widow of Fred C. Mabbutt,
deceased,
Defendants,

No. 20473

F I L E D
December 31, 1986

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial Commission
through its administrative law judge, issued findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order allowing death benefits for
applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who
died of a heart attack while working as a miner for plaintiff
Price River Coal Co. ("PRC"). Mrs. Mabbutt's claim for compensation was based upon the Workers7 Compensation Act, U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986), which allows compensation to "the dependents of every such employee who is killed,
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment."
PRC's Motion for Reconsideration or Review was denied by the
Industrial Commission. PRC thereupon filed this action for
review. We remand for additional findings of fact.
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on October 23, 1981, at
the end of his eight-hour shift as a belt attendant in PRC's
underground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mabbutt7s job consisted
of keeping certain underground conveyor belts working, and of
keeping the belt rollers and the area surrounding these belts
free of coal dust and other materials which fall from the belts
or collect around them in the normal course of their operation.
According to both appellants and respondents, the crux
of this case is the question of whether there is substantial
evidence to support the decision of the administrative law
judge that Fred Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent death
satisfies the requirement of section 35-1-45 that the death
be "by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment." However, both sides disagree about the appropriate legal
standard to be applied in evaluating the evidence. Therefore,

we have two questions on appeal. The first is what constitutes
a compensable "accident." The second question is whether the
evidence of Mr. Mabbutt's activities on the day of his death
satisfies the element of causation such that the accident, if
one did occur, was in fact related to his employment.
There is no need to dwell at length on the question
of the appropriate legal standard. This issue has just been
dealt with extensively in Allen v. Industrial Commission,
No. 20026 (Utah November 14, 1986). There we attempted to
settle the meaning of the term "by accident," which had become
confused by varying and inconsistent statements from this Court
over a long period of time. The Allen definition is as follows:
"where either the cause of the injury or the result of an exertion was different from what would normally be expected to
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended
and therefore 'by accident'." Id., slip op. at 9 (emphasis in
original); see id., slip op. at 10. This definition follows
the standard articulated in Carling v. Industrial Commission,
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in earlier decisions
of this Court that can be traced back to 1922, including most
notably Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah
1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This standard has been followed most
recently in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888,
890-91 (Utah 1981).
Under the Allen standard, it is fairly easy to
determine that Mr. Mabbutt did die "by accident" on October 23,
1981. His heart attack was certainly an "unexpected or unintended" event that resulted in his death. Allen v. Industrial
Commission, slip op. at 10. However, the finding that the death
was "by accident" does not complete the analysis of whether the
resulting injury is compensable. Under Allen, the more difficult question involves the determination of whether the injury
had the requisite connection with the employment duties—whether
it arose "out of or in the course of . . . employment." U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986); see Allen v. Industrial
Commission, slip op. at 10.
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a test to assure
that there was a causal connection between the injury and the
employment duties of the injured party was sometimes dealt with
in our cases by requiring that the occurrence resulting in the
injury be shown to have involved "unusual exertion." Allen v.
Industrial Commission, slip op. at 11-13. This is the standard
apparently applied by the Commission in this case and found to
have been met.
However, Allen discarded the usual/unusual exertion
distinction as a means for determining whether the injury was
the result of an "accident." Instead, the Court dealt with the
No. 20473
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causation requirement in more candid terms that focus frankly
on the questions of legal and medical causation. It delineated
the analysis as follows:
Under the legal test, the law must define
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of
"arising out of the employment" . . . [then]
the doctors must say whether the exertion
(having been held legally sufficient to
support compensation) in fact caused this
[injury].
Id*, slip op. at 13-14, citing Larson, Workman's Compensation
§ 38.83(a) at 7-276 to -277 (1986).
In applying the Allen analysis to the present case,
then, the first question is whether legal cause has been shown.
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an
activity connected with the employee's duties, will suffice to
show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition, then he or she must show that the employment
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over
and above the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen v. Industrial Commission slip op. at 16.
In appraising whether the employee's exertion would be usual or
ordinary in nonemployment life, an objective standard is to be
applied that is based on the nonemployment life of the average
person, not the nonemployment life of a particular worker. Id.
The requirement of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is designed to screen out those injuries that result from a personal
condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from
exertions required of the employee in the workplace. Id., slip
op. at 14. 1
1. As a practical matter, when the Allen standard is being
applied to cases which may involve preexisting conditions,
before evidence is taken on the issue of legal cause, the
Commission would be well-advised to first make a determination
of whether or not the preexisting condition does in fact exist.
If a preexisting condition exists, then the parties and the
hearing officer will know that the "extraordinary exertion"
test will be applied to the facts as they are developed, and
the evidence can be appropriately prepared and marshalled for
presentation to the fact finder. If a preexisting condition
does not exist, the hearing may be expedited because there will
be no need to show how hard the employee was or was not working,
only that the employment activity led to the injury. Of course,
even if a preexisting condition is involved, if the Commission
finds that legal cause does exist, then it is still appropriate
to refer the matter to a medical panel to determine whether the
facts, as determined at the legal cause hearing, ,are sufficient
to establish medical causation.
3
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In the present case, Mabbutt was suffering from a
preexisting condition which contributed greatly to his heart
attack. The evidence is uncontroverted that he had hypertensive cardiovascular disease, athersclerotic cardiovascular
disease, and possibly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hypertension
was exacerbated by his obesity and possibly a high salt diet.
He was a diabetic and had gout. The doctor on the medical
panel, to which this case was referred by the administrative
law judge, concluded that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's
work "had any relationship to [his] development of coronary
artery disease."
Since Mabbutt brought heart disease to the workplace,
before legal causation can be established, the Commission must
find that his employment activities involved exertion or stress
in excess of the normally expected level of nonemployment
activity for men and women in the latter half of the twentieth
century. If such a finding is made, then the requirement of
legal cause is satisfied because it"is presumed that the
employment increased the risk of injury to which that worker
was otherwise subject in his nonemployment life. At that point
the inquiry shifts to medical cause, i.e., whether the injured
party's work-related activities were, in fact, causally linked
to the injury. Id., slip op. at 17.
The question of whether the employment activities of a
given employee are sufficient to satisfy the legal, standard of
unusual or extraordinary effort involves two steps. First, the
agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what were the
employment-related activities of the injured employee. Second,
the agency must decide whether those activities amounted to
unusual or extraordinary exertion. This second determination
is a mixed question of law and fact.
Because the whole legal cause determination hinges
upon the agency's findings as to what the injured worker's jobrelated activities were, our review of the Commission's decision
must begin with those findings. In the present case, we are
unable to affirm the Commission's ruling because of the inadequacy of these findings. In his job, Mabbutt worked alone in
the mine, and he encountered only one person while working on
the day of his death. For that reason, it was necessary to
infer what Mabbutt's activities were from the conflicting evidence adduced at the hearing before the administrative law
judge. The company brought in an expert to describe his understanding of the exertion required to perform that particular
job. His testimony would support a conclusion that no unusual
or extraordinary effort was required. On the other hand,
Mabbutt's widow introduced testimony from a fellow worker who
described how she had seen Mabbutt perform the work, testimony
that might support a conclusion that the effort required was
unusual. This testimony was disputed by the company.
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Unfortunately, the administrative law judge's findings
do not resolve the conflicts in the testimony and do not indicate that he made a finding as to exactly what Mabbutt's activities were on the day of his death. Absent such findings, it is
impossible for us to take the next step and determine whether
Mabbutt's work-related activities, as found by the Commission,
rose to the level necessary to satisfy the "unusual or extraordinary" exertion threshold established by Allen for injured
employees with preexisting problems.
The administrative law judge found that "Mabbutt died
as the result of an accident in the course of his employment
. . . resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with
his employment." (Emphasis added.) It may be argued that this
is a sufficient finding of legal cause to warrant our affinning
the Commission on this point. However, the "finding" of unusual
exertion and stress is nothing more than a conclusion. It is
not supported by anything that could be construed as a finding
as to precisely what Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death.
We cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion of fact and law when
its necessary premises are not evident.
There is an added problem here. The Commission
decided this case under pre-Allen law. We cannot determine
whether the administrative law judge used the words "unusual
exertion" in the same sense as they have been defined by Allen.
A talismanic incantation of "unusual or extraordinary exertion"
is not a substitute for careful analysis by the Commission of
whether the actual job-related activities in question exceed the
normally expected level of activity for men and women in the
latter half of the twentieth century.2 In the present case, we
are uncertain of the standard applied by the Commission and
cannot tell how the stated conclusion was reached. For that
reason, we must reverse and remand the matter to the Commission
so that proper findings of fact can be entered and the Allen
standard can be applied to them to determine legal cause.
2. We reject, categorically, the suggestion advanced by the
company that because the belt-attendant job is sometimes performed by women, it must necessarily involve less than extraordinary effort or strain. We take judicial notice of the fact
that women, as a group, tend to be smaller in size and have
less physical strength than do men, as a group. However, with
respect to size and strength, individual men and women are
arrayed over a continuum from one extreme, to the other. No
generalization can be made that because a woman performs a certain job it necessarily involves strength and exertion requirements at the lower end of the spectrum, and the contrary is, of
course, true of a job performed by a man. Each job's demands
must be evaluated on their own; they cannot be categorized as
requiring "usual" or "unusual" exertion simply because they are
normally done by women or men, respectively.
5
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A word about the issue of medical cause. As noted,
the administrative law judge did not resolve conflicts in the
testimony about Mabbutt's work activities. However, he did
adopt the findings of the medical panel, which contained a
doctor's assumptions about what Mabbutt was actually doing on
the day in question, and which then relied on those factual
assumptions in finding a causal link between the work and his
death. The factual recitation in the panel report'was derived
from the conflicting evidence presented at the hearing and inferences drawn from that evidence. In a number of respects, as
the company demonstrated at the hearing on its objections to
the medical panel report and in its brief on appeal, the panel
was confused as to some of the basic duties of Mabbutt's job
and made assumptions about his actual activities which are
unsupported by the evidence.
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve
conflicts in the factual evidence regarding the injured party's
activities. Section 35-1-85 of the Code places that responsibility solely on the Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974
ed.). Under Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to
take the facts as found by the administrative law judge and
consider them in light of its medical expertise to assist the
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause has
been proven. The medical panel strays beyond its province when
it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative
law judge improperly abdicates his function if he permits the
panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830
(Utah 1978).
We acknowledge that during the adjudication of this
matter, the Commission was laboring under the confusing and
conflicting state of the law as it had developed prior to Allen.
The issues presented by this and similar cases should be easier
to resolve in the future. However, questions of some subtly
will remain in cases involving claims for internal failure
where the worker has a preexisting condition that contributes
to the injury and where a determination mus*t be made as to
whether a specific work activity amounts to "unusual or extraordinary" exertion. The concept of "unusual or extraordinary"
exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of necessity,
the process of pouring specific content into that concept will
rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and familiarity
with the work environment.
This case is remanded to the Industrial Commission for
findings of fact as to what Mabbutt's activities actually were
on the day of his death. Based upon those findings, and upon a
review of Allen, the Commission may then adhere to or abandon
its conclusion that those activities amounted to extraordinary
exertion. Because the determination of medical cause must be
No. 20473
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based upon the Commission's findings as to the actual activities
of the worker, and because the panel's report in the present
case rested upon the medical panel's improper assumptions as
to the facts, the Commission should resubmit the question of
medical causation to the panel after it has made the appropriate
factual findings.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

STEWART, Justice:

(Dissenting)

I dissent. In one of the first important tests of
the rules laid down in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah
Adv. Rep. (November 14, 1986), the majority reverses and
remands to "resubmit the question of medical causations to the
panel." But the medical panel has already addressed that
exact question, and the administrative law judge found that
the decedent's death was caused by his job-related activities
on the day that the fatal accident occurred. What more the
court expects than has been done by the Commission is not
explained by the majority. In my view, the administrative law
judge was correct in his ruling, the Commission so found, and
I agree.
It is precisely this kind of case that demonstrates
that our newly formulated methods of analysis will inevitably
draw the Commission off into pathways that are bound, I
believe, to lead to error. The Court's unfortunate requirement that, since Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, the
Commission must find "that his employment activities involved
exertion or stress in excess of the normally expected level of
activity for men and women in the latter of the twentieth
century," is precisely the discriminatory application of
worker's compensation laws to workers with a preexisting
condition, which I referred to in my dissent in Allen.

7
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I would affirm on the authority of Pittsburg Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983) and Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Like
Pittsburg Testing and Monfredi, the decedent's preexisting
coronary condition was clearly aggravated in this case. The
administrative law judge made that clear in his findings:
[T]here is no way of knowing exactly
how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the
applicant first felt the effects of that
stress or at what time he actually died
but it could have been some hours before
4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to
speculate as to those times or as to the
excessive stress or exertion later in the
afternoon in view of the fact that two
fine cardiologists have agreed that the
evidence is sufficient to convince them
that the death was industrially related.
The Administrative Law Judge finds
that Mr. Mabbutt died as the result of an
accident in the course of his employment
on October 23, 1981 resulting from unusual
exertion and stress connected with his
employment on that fateful afternoon.
I would affirm. The Commission has found the necessary
facts and it is not for us to ignore them.

Hall, Chief Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Stewart.
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This case involves the death Fred C. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981.
The Commission, previously entered an Order awarding Mr. Mabbutt*s widow death
benefits in this case. The employer, by and through counsel, filed an appeal
with the Utah Supreme Court.
In an opinion filed December 31, 1986, a
majority of the Court found that the case should be "remanded to the
Industrial Commission for findings of fact as to what Mabbutt's activities
actually were on the date of his death." The Court also instructed that "the
Commission should resubmit the question of medical causation to the panel
after it has made the appropriate factual findings."
The Administrative Law Judge made his findings on or about July 8,
1987, and referred the same to the medical panel for its further evaluation.
The medical panel filed its supplemental report on September 1, 1987.
Unfortunately, that report contained a typographical error in the following
passage: "I still feel that the patient's work activities were an inmaterial
(sic) contributing factor to his death from coronary artery disease."
Thereafter, the applicant by and through counsel, filed a request for
clarification of the supplemental panel report with the Commission. Shortly
thereafter, the employer, by and through counsel, indicated that the error was
clearly a typographical error, and that the defendants could not understand
why the file was being referred on for further clarification. Apparently, the
employer did not fully review the report of Dr. Perry, since the very next
sentence stated: "If he did not have coronary artery disease, the stress and
work of that occasion would not have percipitated (sic) his demise." Since
this sentence is inconsistent with the sentence containing the error,
vigilance would have required the employer to ask for a clarification also.
The employer did not see fit to do so, but rather after the clarification was
received from Dr. Perry indicating that the sentence should have read: I
still feel that the patient's work activities were a material contributing
factor to his death from coronary artery disease." Upon receipt of that
report, then the employer filed an objection to the medical panel report
contending that the clarification had completely altered the meaning of the
original report. However, a close review of the file, including the medical
panel's original report will indicate that for the panel to have made the
finding contended by the employer, would have required a 360 degree turnabout
on the part of the medical panel. If such were the case, again vigilance
would have required that the employer seek a clarification of this astounding
turnabout by the doctor, if such was the case. Therefore, in a technical
sense, the applicant's motion to have the defendant's objections to the
medical panel report stricken in a technical sense should be granted.
However, recognizing that the Commission is not bound by any stricken rules of
evidence or procedure, I have denied the motion so that a full record might be
made in this case.
The tenor of the employer's objection to the medical panel report is
first that the applicant's work activities of October 23, 1981, were not the
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necessary precipitating factor resulting in his death. However, it would
appear to the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have missed the
point of the Workers Compensation Act. The Act does not require that the
death of an individual be the result of a necessary precipitating factor,
rather the Workers Compensation Act would appear to only require that the work
activity were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting in the death of the
employee.
When the issue is framed as such, it seems clear to the
Administrative Law Judge that there really is no disputed medical issue in
this case. A close and careful review of the medical report of the employer*s
medical expert, Dr. Fowles, dated November 25, 1987, indicates as much. Dr.
Fowles indicates **I agree with Dr. Perry that individuals without coronary
disease usually do not die from physical exertion or emotional stress.**
Further down in the report the doctor indicates "I repeat my statement
rendered in the hearing of October 24, 1984, that on the whole, extreme
physical exertion and emotional stress can accompany sudden cardiac death and
are sufficient but are not necessary/* In Dr. Fowles testimony, he was asked
if the activities of Mr. Mabbutt of October 23, 1981, were sufficient
precipitating events, to which he answered they were. He also went on to
indicate that he agreed with Dr. Perry and Dr. Yanowitz that the applicant's
activities of October 23, 1981, contributed something substantial to increase
the applicant's risk he already faced of having a heart attack. Again, the
only difference of opinion, if there is one, is Dr. Fowles* belief that "the
events on the date of his death were not necessary for sudden cardiac death.*4
However, as I have indicated, I find that our law does not require that the
work activities be necessary to cause a heart attack, only that they be a
sufficient cause of the applicant's problem. For the above stated reasons, I
find that the objections to the supplemental medical panel report of the
employer should be, and the same are hereby denied. Accordingly, the medical
panel report is admitted into evidence.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT:
Fred C. Mabbutt was employed by Price River Coal as a belt
attendant. This job consisted of keeping the conveyor belts working and
clean, and also required the rock dusting of the area at the end of each
shift. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt arose from bed as usual, and after
shaving bade his wife goodbye. At approximately 7:00 a.m., he picked up c
co-worker, who testified that Mr. Mabbutt seemed fine and was not complaining
about his health or about chest pains. Mr. Mabbutt then reported for work at
8:00 a.m., and thereupon discovered that the flyte pump or sump pump was
clogged. As a result, the normal holding area known as the block dam, was
accumulating coal fines (fine coal particles) in a pile. The deceased was
attempting to unplug this clog in the pump by using a one inch high pressure
hose in an effort to flush out the blockage.
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At 11:15 a.m., the belt inspector, Gene Miller, approached Mr.
Mabbutt and observed that he was attempting to unplug the pump blockage with
the high pressure hose, and that the pump was off. Since it was close to
lunch time, Mr. Miller suggested to the deceased that he relax and take it
easy, since the line was already plugged. Mr. Mabbutt was clearly agitated,
and was cursing and attempting to fix the pump. At one point, he became so
frustrated with his in ability to disassemble a clamp, that he threw his
gloves down onto the ground. Mr. Miller also observed that Mabbutt had a pale
face and hands. Mr. Mabbutt was also trying to lift the 110 pound pump out of
the sump by tugging and pulling on the hose, but with no success. Although
Miller suggested to Mabbutt that he eat his lunch, on three separate
occasions, Mabbutt did not do so but rather continued working in the agitated
and charged state. The deceased had advised Mr. Miller that the pump line had
been plugged since the beginning of his shift that morning. Mr. Miller, when
he approached Mr. Mabbutt, observed that the coal fines and muck had spilled
over the block dam, and had cause a puddle in the area 10 feet by 20 feet, two
inches deep in the most shallow point, and approximately two feet deep at the
deepest point. While Miller was attempting to coax the deceased into eating
his lunch, he observed that Mr. Mabbutt had made four trips from the sump area
to the #4 belt. Each bucket of muck weighed at least 65 pounds, and it was
Mr. Mabbutt*s practice to carry two buckets at a time, so as to even out the
weight and ease his ambulation. The distance from the sump to the #4 exchange
belt was approximately 60-70 feet, up a 7% grade or incline. Miller estimated
that to clean the area where Mr. Mabbutt was working would have required the
removal of 100 buckets of muck. Mr. Miller stayed with the deceased until
approximately noon, and at that time moved on to another belt for inspection.
However, Mr. Mabbutt did not eat his lunch with Mr. Miller or while Mr. Miller
was present.
The deceased continued to work in this matter, and the last known
contact with him was a 1:15 p.m. At that time, there was a stoppage of the
belts in the mine, since the problem with one causes the interlock mechanism
to terminate all belt operations. At 1:15 p.m., Miller called Mabbutt and
inquired if there was a problem with his belt. Mabbutt advised Miller that
the problem was not with his belt. Before the belt was shut down at 1:15, it
had been running all morning while Mr. Mabbutt was attempting to solve the
problem with the sump pump. As a result, the accumulations from the belt were
also mounting, since Mr. Mabbutt was not shoveling coal fines from beneath the
rollers or in the vicinity of the drive unit.
The deceased continued shoveling and carrying buckets of muck to the
#4 belt, and continually was engaged in these activities until his unfortunate
demise. At approximately 4:20 p.m., the belt attendant assigned to the next
shift following Mabbutt*s reported to the belt. Upon arriving, she noticed
that the area had not been rock dusted and that the surface of the belt was
partially clean. Further investigation lead her to the discovery of Mr.
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Mabbutt9s body, which had a hose in the left hand, which was still running,
and a shovel near by which was used to shovel muck onto the belt. Also near
by was a muck bucket, which was still wet, although it had been emptied.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the deceased*s activities of
October 23, 1983, amounted to unusual exertion. What we have is a coal miner
who was confronted with a plugged sump pump, which was causing coal fines and
muck to spill over the block dam resulting in a large puddle. The bait line
is a secondary escape way true enough from the mine, but testimony clearly
indicated that in the event of a fire or other tragedy in the mine which would
prevent a miner from seeing his way clear to make an escape, the belt line
offers the only other sure method of escape, because a miner can feel his or
her way out of the mine by following the belt line. Thus it is reasonable to
conclude that Mr. Mabbutt felt he was under some pressure to keep that area of
the mine clean in the event an accident should occur. In addition, Mr.
Mabbutt was under the pressure of being behind in his work, and being
frustrated by an inoperative piece of machinery. There was a possibility of
an MSHA citation being issued if the pile were too big, which only helped add
urgency to Mabbuttfs efforts.
Based on the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Miller, I conclude that
Fred Mabbutt moved the estimated 100 buckets of muck to clean out his area of
the belt, or some amount close to that. It is true that some doubt exists as
to the exact activities of Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, but viewing the
uncontradicted portions of the evidence, and the evidence itself as a whole,
and giving the benefit of the doubt to the applicant, I conclude that Mr.
Mabbutt did move all of the muck that had accumulated in the sump portion, or
at least a major portion of it. I find that his work activities on October
23, 1981, involved usual exertion, especially in light of the problem he was
having with the pump which had caused such a hugh accumulation of muck in he
area. When Mr. Mabbutt was seen by Mr. Miller he was clearly stressed and
pale from his extraordinary efforts that morning. It can hardly be said that
carrying 130 pounds of muck up a steep 7% slope for 70 feet approximately 50
times is something he would have done as an activity of every day life. It is
clear to the Administrative Law Judge that the carrying of all these muck
buckets was extraordinary exertion under any definition of that term.
Further, his efforts at freeing the 110 pound sump pump were also
extraordinary exertions under any definition of the term.
Accordingly,
pursuant to the Allen decision, I find that the work activities of Fred C.
Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, ". . .contributed something substantial to
increase the risk he already faced in every day life because of his
condition." Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) at 25.
Therefore, although the applicant may have had pre-existing coronary disease,
his work activities of October 23, 1981, were clearly extraordinary exertion,
and therefore the legal causation requirement of Allen has been met. The
applicant must also prove medical causation, in that he must show that the
"stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation lead to the
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resulting injury or disability." Allen at 27. In this case, the medical
panel found that the applicants work activities of October 23, 1981, resulted
in the resulting death he sustained as the result of a heart attack on October
23f 1981. This finding was also bolstered by an additional medical expert
that testified on behalf of the applicant9 and is also supported by the
findings of Dr. Fowles, the defendants medical expert. Put differently, all
three cardiologists who have submitted reports in this matter conclude that
the applicants work activities of October 23, 1981, were a sufficient
precipitating factor resulting in his death by heart attack.
The employer has also urged that there be an apportionment of
liability for the death benefits in this case as between it and the Second
Injury Fund. A review of the file indicates that this issue was first raised
by the employer in its letter motion for review on October 19, 1987. The
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund filed a response indicating that the
belated efforts of the employer to raise the apportionment issue at this late
date should be dismissed. The Second Injury Fund points out that the employer
has waived the apportionment of Second Injury Fund liability through their
inaction. The Administrator points out that this case went through the entire
death benefit application procedure including an evidentiary hearing, medical
panel referral and report, hearing on objections to the medical panel report,
issuance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, motion for review,
denial of motion for review, petition for Supreme Court review, Supreme Court
briefs and oral argument, and a decision from the Utah Supreme Court, which
provided that the case be remanded to the Commission for the purpose of
determining what Mr. Mabbutt's actual activities were on October 23, 1981.
Nowhere in any of those proceedings did the employer see fit to raise the
apportionment of liability for death benefits as between itself and the Second
Injury Fund. In fact, the issue was not raised at the second evidentiary
hearing or the second medical panel referral or after the receipt of the first
report. Now, at this late date, the employer seeks to involve apportionment
of the death benefits as between itself and the Second Injury Fund. The
Second Injury Fund cites the case of Pease v. Industrial Commission 694, P2d
613 (Utah 1984) for the proposition that where a party files a motion for
review, they have an obligation to raise all issues that can be presented at
that time and that those issues which are not raised are waived. In the
instant case, the employer did not raise the apportionment issue when it first
filed its motion for review, and it also failed to mention that issue in its
brief to the Utah Supreme Court in its oral argument or even at the second
evidentiary hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. It is therefore my
finding that under the rational of the Pease decision, that the defendant,
Price River Coal, has waived the apportionment of death benefits in this case.
In passing, I might note that even if the right to apportionment of
the death benefits in this case were not waived by the employer, I see no
basis upon the record to grant the relief they seek. There is no apportioning
of liability by the defendant's own expert, Dr. Fowles, does not set forth any
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basis upon which apportionment might be made. On cross-examination, the
medical panel chairman could not quanify what portion of the substantial
material contributing factor would have been due to the applicant's
pre-existing coronary disease, and what might have been due to the unusual
exertion he performed on October 23, 1981. Dr. Yanowitz also was unable to
quanify the relationship in this case. In addition, the Second Injury Fund
has argued that there is no statutory provision allowing for the apportionment
of death benefits in workers compensation cases. By comparison, the employer
argues that there is nothing in the Workers Compensation Act to suggest that
death benefits cannot be apportioned. The arguments of counsel are both
correct, however, the Administrative Law Judge finds that in the absence of a
specific statutory provision allowing for the apportionment of death benefits,
the Administrative Law Judge will not create a right, which has heretofore not
been allowed by either the Legislature or the Utah Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the request of the defendants for apportionment of death benefits
in this case is hereby denied.
As indicated previously, I have found that Fred C. Mabbutt sustained
a compensable industrial accident on October 23, 1981, while employed by Price
River Coal as a belt attendant. On that date, Mr. Mabbutt was earning wages
sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award for death benefits in the
amount of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks for a total of $79,560.00. In
reviewing the file, it appears that these benefits awarded herein will
terminate effective October 16, 1987. Thereafter, the applicant may be
entitled to continuing benefits from Price River Coal/CIGNA Insurance upon the
completion and submission of a Declaration of Dependency form which will be
sent to her by the Industrial Commission. Mrs. Mabbutt should return that
form for further processing by the Administrative Law Judge. In the event the
Declaration of Dependency form indicates that the applicant is still dependent
upon the benefits of the employer for her continued support, then CIGNA will
be entitled to an offset of 50% of the applicants social security death
benefits she is currently receiving.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Fred C. Mabbutt sustained a compensable industrial
October 23, 1981, while employed by Price River Coal Company.

accident

on

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Price River Coal and/or Cigna Insurance
pay Marie T. Mabbutt compensation at the rate of $255.00 per week for 312
weeks for a total of $79,560.00, as compensation for the death of her husband,
Fred C. Mabbutt. These benefits shall commence effective October 24, 1981,
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and are due and owing in a lump sum. These benefits shall also include
interest of 8% per annum commencing effective November 14, 1981, with interest
continuing until payment is made.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Cigna pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for
the applicant, the sum of $14,184.00 for services rendered in this matter, the
same to be deducted from the aforesaid award of the applicant and remitted
directly to his office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of Mrs. Mabbutt's continued
dependency is hereby reserved pending receipt of a Declaration of Dependency
form from her, which will entitle her to benefits after October 16, 1987, if
so found by the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund is hereby dismissed
as a party defendant in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Timothy C^ypwrien
Adminiisrfrjrtive Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah^Salt Lake City, Utah, this
^ ^ day of February, 1988.
ATTEST;

Linda J. Stpasburg
Commission/Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on February 0/7 . 1988 a copy of the attached
ORDER in the case of Fred C. Mabbutt issued February &Lf was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Marie T. Mabbutt
260 West 500 South
Price, Utah 84501
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CIGNA
2180 South 1300 East No. 417
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
James Elegante
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
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On December 31, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in
the above-captioned matter, remanding the case to the Industrial Commission to
more clearly delineate the facts upon which the Administrative Law Judge based
his finding that legal causation was established. The case involves the death
of a coal miner who was found dead at the job site and was determined to have
died due to a heart attack.
The deceased was suffering from several
pre-existing conditions which made him very susceptible to sudden death by
heart attack. Due to the pre-existing conditions, in order for the death to
be compensable, it is necessary to establish that the deceased died as result
of unusual exertion on the job in order to meet the legal causation test. On
remand, the Administrative Law Judge held an additional hearing to take
testimony and the Administrative Law Judge thereafter submitted a Summary of
Testimony to the medical panel for review. The medical panel report and later
clarification of that report resulted in Objections to the Medical Panel
Report being filed by counsel for the defendant on October 19, 1987. On
February 17, 1988, a hearing on Objections to the Medical Panel Report was
held. Based on that hearing, the Administrative Law Judge determined both
medical and legal cause were established and thus he issued an Order awarding
benefits to the widow on February 24, 1988.
On March 7, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Motion for Review
objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that both legal and
medical causation had been established. Counsel for the defendant states that
the medical experts as a whole had concluded it was not necessary that the
deceased was performing exertive work in order for his heart attack to have
occurred.
Because there was no direct evidence as to the nature of the
deceased's activities just prior to the heart attack, counsel for the
defendant concludes there is insufficient evidence on which to base the
finding that the work activities were unusually exertive (legal causation) and
the work activities caused the heart attack (medical causation). Counsel for
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the defendant states that the Administrative Law Judge*s findings of legal and
medical cause were based on unreasonable factual inferences and speculation.
On March 10, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a Cross Motion for
Review arguing that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded
attorney*s fees in addition to benefits awarded as opposed to out of the award
and that the fees should have been calculated based on a percentage of more
than just the first six years of benefits plus any interest awarded. Counsel
for the applicant based this Motion in part on another Administrative Law
Judge's decision to award fees in addition to the benefits in the Commission
case Harrison vs Olympic Oil, Inc., case No. 86000733 (January 7, 1988). On
March 25, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Response to the applicant's
Cross Motion for Review arguing that the applicant's counsel's request for
fees in addition to the award instead of out of the award was against both
case law and statute as well as the Commission's own Rule on attorney's fees.
Counsel for the defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case Graham vs the
Industrial Commission . 495 P. 2d 806 (Utah 1972) as authority for the
proposition that the Commission does not have authority to award fees in
addition to the benefits as a cost against the defending party. Counsel for
the defendant further argues that the discretion allowed the Administrative
Law Judge by the Commission Rule R490-1-4 (b), to vary from the Rule in
awarding fees to avoid an unconscionable result, does not include discretion
to award the fees as a cost but merely allows discretion as to the amount of
the fee to be deducted from the applicant's award. Finally, counsel for the
defendant states there is nothing "unconscionable" about requiring an
applicant to pay his own attorney as this is the normal Rule.
The Commission finds that the two issues on review are:
1.

Whether the Administrative Law Judge's findings of
legal and medical cause are supported by the facts, and

2.

Whether the attorney's fees should be awarded in
addition to the widow's benefits and in an amount
greater than that specified by the Administrative Law
Judge.

The Commission finds that the Administrative Law Judge's reliance on the
testimony of the employees who worked with the deceased and/or were aware of
the deceased's duties is sufficient basis for a finding that the deceased was
exerting himself unusually on the date of his attack. The Commission finds
that it is not absolutely necessary to have eye witness testimony as to the
activities of the deceased 40 minutes prior to his death in order for the
Administrative Law Judge to conclude that legal causation is established.
Furthermore, the Commission finds that the medical evidence regarding
causation does not have to be stated in terms of absolute proof. In this
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case, the Commission finds the terms used by the doctors meets the "reasonable
medical probability" standard adopted by the Industrial Commission and thus
there is sufficient medical evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusions. Therefore, with respect to the first issue, the Commission must
deny the defendant's Motion for Review and affirm the Administrative Law
Judge.
With respect to the second issue, the Commission finds the
Administrative Law Judge correctly calculated the fee to be paid the
applicant's counsel. However, as result of there being no final resolution of
the attorney fees issue first raised in the Harrison case (cited above), the
Commission will reserve decision on the payment of attorney fees in addition
to the award until a final resolution of the attorney fees question in the
Harrison case has occurred.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Review is
denied, and the the applicant's Cross Motion for Review is partially denied
with the issue of attorney fees payable in addition to the award reserved
until a final decision is rendered, in the case Harrison v. Olympic Oil, Inc.
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, case No. 86000733. Except as to the
issue of attorney fees, the Administrative Law Judge's February 24, 1988 Order
is affirmed in all respects.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

4^
Florez
Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Ufeahw Salt Lake City, Utah, this
^ V ^ - d a y of May, 1988.
ATTEST:

ia J. Sifrasburg
Commission Secretary

^
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I certify that on May 3i j^ » 1988, a copy of the attached ORDER
DENYING AND PARTIALLY GRANTING APPLICANT•S CROSS MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case
of MARIE T. MABBUTT, WIDOW OF FRED C. MABBUTT was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Marie T. Mabbutt
260 West 500 South
Price, UT 84501

/vVirginius

Dabney
Attorney at Law
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, UT

84111

CIGNA
2180 South 1300 East, #417
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
James Elegante
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT
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Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge
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